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Detecting botnets in a network is crucial because bot-activities impact numerous 
areas such as security, finance, health care, and law enforcement. Most existing rule and 
flow-based detection methods may not be capable of detecting bot-activities in an 
efficient manner. Hence, designing a robust botnet-detection method is of high 
significance. In this study, we propose a botnet-detection methodology based on graph-
based features. Self-Organizing Map is applied to establish the clusters of nodes in the 
network based on these features. Our method is capable of isolating bots in small clusters 
while containing most normal nodes in the big-clusters. A filtering procedure is also 
developed to further enhance the algorithm efficiency by removing inactive nodes from 
bot detection. The methodology is verified using real-world CTU-13 and ISCX botnet 
datasets and benchmarked against classification-based detection methods. The results 
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During the last 15 years, botnets have caused some of the most devastating and 
costly internet security incidents in the world [1]. The term "bot" comes from robot 
which is also sometimes called Zombie. A bot may also be known as a Web robot or 
WWW robot. It is a type of malware [2] that an attacker can exploit to control an infected 
computer. It is installed into a compromised computer which can be controlled remotely 
by an attacker or a group of attackers for fulfilling their own gain. One of the most 
common methods for a bot program to infect a compromised computer is by a malicious 
website the user is visiting that silently searches and exploits vulnerability in the user's 
system in order to install the bot on it. Some other ways to infect include sending the bot 
as an attached file with spam emails, or as a program dropped from the payload of 
another malware. After successful installation of bot code into the compromised 
computer, it becomes part of large network of compromised computers and hence the 
term “botnet” is used. Attacker can issue commands to a single bot, or to all the bots in 
botnet. The attacker controlling the botnet is sometimes referred to as the 
“botherder””botmaster” or “controller” [3]. Figure 1 shows a typical botnet cycle. 
Contrary to existing malware such as viruses and worms, which focus on attacking the 
 
2 
infecting host, bots can receive commands from botmaster and can also be used in a 
distributed attack platform [4]. 
 
Figure 1.1 Botnet life cycle 
 
Botnets can significantly damage the security of individuals and businesses. They 
pose a serious and growing threat against cyber-security as they provide a distributed 
platform for many cyber-crimes such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 
against critical targets, malware dissemination, phishing, and click fraud [5, 6]. Even in 
some cases, botmasters sell access to the botnet to other criminals – either on a rental 
basis or as an outright sale [7]. As a result, botnet detection has been a major research 
topic in recent years. Researchers have proposed several detection approaches for botnet 
detection to combat botnet threat against cyber-security [8]. A majority of the existing 
Botnet detection approaches concentrate primarily on particular Botnet command and 
control (C&C) protocols (e.g., HTTP, IRC) and structures (e.g., centralized or P2P). They 
follow rule based approaches to detect botnets in network. However, these approaches 
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can become ineffective and obsolete if botnets change their structure and C&C 
techniques to evade detection [4]. Thus, a robust botnet detection approach that can 
detect any type of botnet with varying characteristics is of utmost importance. Before 
exploring existing botnet detection schemes in literature, we first survey some of the 
studies done in anomaly detection. Later, existing efforts dedicated to bot detection are 
identified that can be divided into two broad categories: botnet detection using NetFlow 
based features and graph-based features. 
1.2 Anomaly detection techniques 
Researchers have conducted extensive research on anomaly detection techniques 
over the years. For example: Fadlullah et al. [9] develop a novel detection technique 
called DTRAB to infer DDoS attacks. The authors investigated the detection of attacks 
against application-level protocols that are encapsulated via encryption. In essence, this 
detection scheme is a distributed detection mechanism capable of detecting the 
anomalous events as early as possible. Moreover, DTRAB is able to simultaneously 
construct a defensive mechanism to discover attacks as well as find out the root of the 
threat by tracing back the attacker’s original network. The effectiveness of this scheme is 
validated via simulation. Flow correlation information is utilized by Zhang et al. [10, 11, 
12] to further improve the classification accuracy considering only a small number of 
training instances based on K-NN and Naive Bayes classifier that are used to detect 
anomalies in the network. Yan et al. [13] propose a framework of security and trust for 
5G based on the perspective that the next generation network functions will be highly 
virtualized and software defined networking is applied for traffic control. The proposed 
approach by the researchers utilizes adaptive trust evaluation and management 
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technologies as well as sustainable trusted computing technologies to achieve computing 
platform trust and software defined networking security. A qualitative comparison 
between the advantages and disadvantages of software defined networking and traditional 
networking regarding security issues concerning overall architecture and a detailed 
analysis of the threats of software defined networking from the perspective of functional 
layers and attack types is provided by Shu et al. [14]. 
1.3 Flow-Based Methods 
The botnet detection literature using NetFlow based features is a rich one and 
many researchers have significantly contributed in this area (e.g. [15-17]). Most of the 
existing detection schemes falls into either of the two types of methods: clustering and 
classification ([24, 27, 29]), and others. 
Clustering is a popular approach taken by researchers to detect botnets using flow 
based features. Zeidanloo et al. have proposed a botnet detection framework that can 
detect botnets without prior knowledge of them [19]. This detection framework is based 
on finding similar communication patterns and behaviors among the group of hosts that 
are performing at least one malicious activity using X-means clustering. Using Audit 
Record Generation and Utilization System (ARGUS) [20], the authors have collected 
flow based information such as source IP address, destination IP address, source Port, 
destination Port, duration, protocol, number of packets, and number of bytes transferred 
in both directions, which are later used to detect the group of hosts that exhibit similar 
behavior and communication pattern. Karasaridis et al. have developed a K-mean based 
method that employs scalable non-intrusive algorithms that analyze vast amounts of 
summary traffic data [22]. Gu et al. have proposed a novel anomaly-based botnet 
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detection system that is independent of the protocol and structure used by botnets [26]. 
This detection system has exploited the essential definition and properties of botnets, i.e., 
bots within the same botnet exhibit similar C&C communication patterns and similar 
malicious activities patterns. It utilizes a number of flow based information such as time, 
source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port, duration, and the number of 
packets and bytes transferred in both directions. C-plane clustering method is used to read 
the communication logs generated by C plane monitor and find clusters that share similar 
communication pattern. Arshad et al. have developed an anomaly-based method that 
require not a priori knowledge of bot signatures, botnet C&C protocols, and the C&C 
server addresses [28]. Flow characteristics such as IP, port, packet event times, and bytes 
per packet are examined by Amini et al. to detect botnets where these NetFlow data is 
collected, filtered, and is finally clustered using hierarchical clustering [25]. Rule based 
methods are then applied to refine the clusters to reduce the percentage of false positives. 
Among the authors’ who use classification techniques, Strayer et al. have 
developed detection approaches by examining flow characteristics such as bandwidth, 
packet timing, and burst duration, where they first eliminate traffic that is unlikely to be a 
part of a botnet, classify the remaining traffic into a group that is likely to be part of a 
botnet by using J48 decision trees, naïve Bayes, and Bayesian classifier, and finally 
correlate the likely traffic to find common communications patterns that would suggest 
the activity of a botnet [24,29]. Fairly recently, a decision tree classifier has been used by 
Zhao et al. to detect botnets by investigating 12 flow based features [27]. Their proposed 
method can detect botnets during the C&C and attack phases based on the observation of 
network flow characteristics for specific time intervals. It does not require significant 
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malicious activity to occur before detection as it can recognize command and control 
signals. Simultaneously, it does not require the group behavior of several bots before it 
can be confident about making a decision.  
Lu et al. have incorporated both classification and clustering techniques in 
detection of botnets, developing an unsupervised botnet detection framework where they 
first identify network traffic from existing known applications, then focus on each 
application community that might include botnet communication flows [30]. This 
network traffic is then clustered to find the anomalous behaviors on that specific 
application community based on the n-gram features extracted from the content of 
network flows. The proposed detection framework has been evaluated on an IRC 
community and results show that this approach obtains a high detection rate with a very 
low false alarm rate when detecting IRC botnet traffic.  
Apart from classification and clustering techniques, there are a number of other 
studies that employ other approaches in botnet detection using NetFlow based features. 
Interested readers can refer to [18, 21, 23, 31, and 32] for such related works.  
Limitation: Existing methods of botnet Detection based on NetFlow traffic 
features rely on computing statistical features of flow traffic or on deep packet inspection. 
As a result, these methods only capture the characteristics of bots effects on individual 
links, rather than on the topological structure of a neighborhood/subgraph as a whole. In 
particular, flow-based detection methods require the comparison of each traffic flow to 
all the others in order to determine malicious traffic, instead of monitoring the network 
behaviors in a holistic manner. Such techniques are also deficient in that attackers can 
evade detection by the use of encrypting commands or changes in data volume or change 
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in some other behavioral characteristics such as by the use of variable length encryption 
or changes in packet structure that leads to new behavioral characteristics. To overcome 
this deficiency, another stream of research has focused on detecting botnets based on 
graph-based features. This approach is fundamentally more efficient than flow based 
approaches since it avoids the need to cross compare flows across the dataset [33]. 
1.4 Graph-Based Methods 
There are a number of studies that use different graph-based features to detect 
anomalies. Literature in this domain can be broadly categorized into two groups: one 
group detects anomalies in static graphs using graph-based features whereas another 
group does the same, but with dynamic graphs. The static graphs can be further 
categorized into plain graphs and attributed graphs. Among the studies that use plain 
graphs for anomaly detection, Ding et al. [34], Henderson et al. [35], Henderson et al. 
[36], Kang et al. [37], Aggarwal [38], Zimek et al. [39], Chen and Giles [40] and many 
more utilize structure-based patterns to detect anomalies. On the other hand, studies done 
by Sun et al. [41], Tong and Lin [42], Ambai et al. [43], Nikulin and Huang [44] focus on 
the utilization of community based patterns to detect anomalies. Similarly, for attributed 
graphs Davis et al. [45], Eberle and Holder [46], and Kontkanen and Myllymki [47] use 
structure based patterns whereas Gao et al. [48], Muller et al. [49], Perozzi et al. [50] use 
community based patterns to detect anomalies. With dynamic graphs, authors have used 
the notion of graph similarity based on certain properties such degree distribution, 
diameter [51-53], by resorting to matrix or tensor decomposition of the time-varying 
graphs [54-57], or by monitoring graph communities over time and reporting events 
when there is structural or contextual change in any of them [58,59]. 
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Botnet detection studies using graph-based features mainly exploits the spatial 
relationships in communication traffic [31,60,61]. Collins and Reiter have proposed a 
method to identify bots by noting that scanning behavior initiated by bot infected hosts 
would tend to connect different disconnected components of protocol-specific traffic 
graphs [70]. Wang and Paschalidis [62] use behavioral characteristics of bots to detect 
botnets. Primarily, the authors have focused on analyzing the social relationships that are 
modeled as graph of nodes. The authors have considered both social interaction graphs 
and social correlation graphs and have applied the proposed method to a real-world case 
study. However, for this detection scheme to be successful bots need to show systematic 
pattern in behavior that may not be very robust for stealthy botnet. ‘Graption’ is a graph-
based method proposed by Iliofotou et al. that identifies peer-to-peer flows by calculating 
the in-degree to out degree ratio of hosts in protocol traffic graphs [63]. However, this 
method can be defeated by protocol randomization. A graph-based detection approach to 
detect web-account abuse attack has been proposed by Zhao et al. where the correlations 
among botnet activities are uncovered by constructing large user-user graphs [64]. This 
approach, termed as ‘BotGraph’ has two components: aggressive sign-up detection and 
stealthy bot user connection. The first component ensures that the total number of 
possible bots are limited whereas second component detects stealthy bot users based on 
constructing a user-user random undirected graph. Only the edge weight feature has been 
used to detect bots in the graph. Although, the detection rate is very high, this method’s 
accuracy can be disputed if other types of botnets besides the spamming one need to be 
detected. Jaikumar and Kak have presented a graph-based framework for isolating 
botnets in a network [65]. This framework uses temporal co-occurrences in the activity 
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space to detect botnets. This makes the framework independent of the software 
architecture of the malware infecting the hosts. The proposed framework has been 
validated by applying it to a simulated environment. However, this approach falls short if 
bots don’t exhibit temporally co-occurring malicious activities. Nagaraja et al. have 
proposed a botnet detection technique based on structured graph analysis that localizes 
botnet members by identifying unique communication patterns arising from the overlay 
topologies prevalent in command and control structure [66]. However, this approach 
must be paired with some other malware detection scheme to clearly distinguish botnets 
from regular flows. Francois et al. have proposed an approach called ‘BotTrack’ where 
NetFlow related data is correlated and a host dependency model is leveraged for 
advanced data mining purposes [67]. They have used the popular linkage analysis 
algorithm ‘PageRank’ with an additional clustering process to efficiently detect botnets. 
However, to validate the proposed method, the researchers have only used 13.7 GB of 
real world data; also, they have generated the botnet randomly as the dataset was not 
labeled. Moreover, the authors’ have assumed that a certain percentage of bots and their 
characteristic were known beforehand. So, if an unknown botnet exists in the network, 
their approach may not give good results. Francois et al. have further extended their work 
on ‘BotTrack’ by developing a scalable method called ‘BotCloud’ for detecting botnets 
regarding the relationships between hosts [68]. The evaluation of this method has showed 
a good detection accuracy and a good efficiency based on a Hadoop cluster. But, in this 
case also, the authors have initially used a botnet free dataset and later randomly have 
generated botnets in them. Hang et al. have used community detection based clustering to 
identify long-lived low intensity flows using graph-based features [69].  
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Limitation: Similar to botnet detection methods using statistical features of 
flow/packet traffic or in some cases even deep packet inspection, existing graph-based 
botnet detection methods available in the literature have some major limitations. Many of 
them apply the botnet detection scheme that operates in a simulated environment (e.g. 
[65]). Moreover, the detection approach proposed in the literature is mostly rule based, 
meaning that a predetermined rule needs to be established beforehand to detect botnets 
from a graph (e.g., [60]). This approach may lead to unwarranted result if bots behave 
differently from a common norm. Although many of the graph-based detection schemes 
use filtering to remove bot free data (e.g., [64, 66]) and then apply a detection method, 
the amount of data that needs to be investigated to detect botnets is relatively large. 
Simultaneously, if dataset is large, the computational expense is often high for the 
detection approach; which is a huge disadvantage if faster detection is required [64]. 
1.5 Significance of Our Approach 
An important step towards developing a new graph-based detection approach 
would be to develop a method that is fast and does not follow any particular rule to detect 
botnets. Simultaneously, the approach must be validated on a real world dataset with 
different types of botnets. This detection scheme should also be robust enough so that it 
can be able to reduce the amount of data that is further investigated to detect any kind of 
botnet present in the dataset. In this study, we have proposed an approach based on 
graph-based features that can fulfil these requirements. Our main contribution can be 
summarized as: 




• Our approach does not depend on any rules to detect botnets and is 
capable of capturing the changing behavior of bots. 
• Seven graph-based features are used in this study to detect botnets. 
• The proposed method can detect different types of botnets with different 
types of behavioral characteristics. 
• A real world dataset is used to validate the results. 
However, handling real world big data consisting of botnets is challenging.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief 
description of the real world dataset used in this study. Chapter 3 discusses in detail the 
seven features used to detect botnets and the clustering methodology implemented to 
cluster these features. Chapter 4 provides numerical results obtained after applying 
clustering methodology to the real world dataset as well as giving a comparative 
overview of applying classification techniques.  Chapter 5 concludes our work and 





2.1 Data Description  
Big data has been an area of interest among researchers in recent years. For 
instance: Tsai et al. [71] have provided a comprehensive review on studies that attempt to 
develop new schemes capable of handling big data during the input, analysis, and output 
stages of knowledge discovery. They have found that majority of the existing literature is 
focused on innovative methods for data mining and analysis. However, little to no 
attention have been given to the pre- and post-analysis processing methods. Evolution 
based algorithms such as accelerated particle swam optimization is used to reduce the 
dimensionality of big data by Fong et al. [72]. Authors have investigated the applicability 
their method on exceptionally large volume of data with high degree dimensions and 
have found that the proposed method results in enhanced analytical accuracy within 
reasonable processing time. In this study, big data consisting botnet is used for validating 
the proposed detection methodology. In this study we use the CTU-13 dataset which is 
one of the biggest labelled datasets available that consists of botnet traffic as well as 
normal and background labeled data. It was captured at Czech Technological University 
in 2011. The developers of the dataset have originally developed it to compare three 
detection methods, namely Cooperative Adaptive Mechanism for Network Protection 
(CAMNEP) method, BCIus detetection method, and BotHunter method [73]. Researchers 
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have found that BCIus and CAMNEP detection methods cannot be generalized for all 
types of botnet behavior. Each of them seems fit for different types of behavior. Analysis 
of BotHunter detection method shows that in real environments it can still be useful to 
have blacklists of known malicious IP addresses known beforehand.  
After the development of CTU-13 dataset, it has been used by Grill et al. [74] to 
evaluate the effects of Local Adaptive Multivariate Smoothing (LAMS) model on the 
NetFlow anomaly detection engine. The proposed method is able to reduce false alarm 
rate of anomaly detection based intrusion detection systems. Fairly recently, 
Chanthakoummane et al. [75] have utilized five scenarios of the CTU-13 dataset to 
evaluate the Snort-IDS rules detection botnets and analyze the function of the botnets in 
three rules packet such as botnet-cnc.rules, blacklist.rules, and spyware-put.rules. 
Experimental results show that botnet-cnc.rules can detect botnets for 29798 alerts. 
Blacklist.rules can detect botnets for up to 44 alerts. Spyware-put.rules cannot detect any 
botnet. The researchers eventually surmise that botnet-cnc.rules are most proficient in 
detecting botnets. 
Although, researchers are excited about the potential of using CTU-13 datasets in 
detecting botnets, (e.g., see Malowidzki et al. [76], Chanthakoumman et al. [75]) 
according to best of this author’s knowledge, no significant work has been done using 
CTU-13 data in the detection of botnets. CTU 13 dataset consists of 13 captures (called 
scenarios) of different botnet samples [61]. This dataset was designed with goals such as  
• Dataset must have real botnet attacks, not simulated attacks 
• Must have real world traffic 
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• Must have ground truth labels for training and evaluating methods 
discussed in [73] 
• Must include multiple types of botnets. 
• Must have several bots infected simultaneously to capture synchronization 
patterns. 
• Must have NetFlow files to protect the privacy of the users. 
A scenario in CTU-13 can be defined as a particular infection of the virtual 
machines using a specific malware. Data collection period for each scenario is 
significantly different from one another. The duration of recorded NetFlow data vary 
from 0.26 hours to 66.85 hours and subsequently the amount of NetFlow data also varies 
accordingly. Multiple types of bots are found in the scenarios. Majority of the scenarios 
have only one bots (scenario 1-8 and 13), whereas few (scenario 9-12) have multiple bots 
in them. Percentage of botnet flow is also very negligible (<2%) compared to total 
NetFlow for majority of the scenarios. However, botnet flow percentage increases (6-8%) 
when there are multiple bots present in the dataset (except scenario 12). Another 
distinctive feature of CTU-13 dataset is that, each scenario has been manually analyzed 
and labeled. The labeling process was performed inside the NetFlow files. Table 2.1 
provides a summary of the amount of data on each botnet scenario and percentage of 






Table 2.1 Characteristics of Botnet Scenarios [37] 
Dataset IRC Spam CF PS DDoS FF P2P US HTTP Note 
1 ✓  ✓  ✓         
2 ✓  ✓  ✓         
3 ✓    ✓     ✓    
4 ✓     ✓    ✓   UDP and ICMP 
DDoS 
5  ✓   ✓      ✓  Scan web 
proxies  
6    ✓       Proprietary 
C&C.RDP 
7         ✓  Chinese hosts 
8    ✓       Proprietary 
C&C.Net 
BIOS,STUN 
9 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓        
10 ✓     ✓    ✓   UDP DDoS 
11 ✓     ✓    ✓   ICMP DDoS 
12       ✓    Synchronization 
13  ✓   ✓      ✓  Captcha, Web 
mail 
IRC: Internet relay chat 
CF: Click fraud 
PS: Port scanned 
DDOS: Distributed Denial of service 
ICMP: Internet Control Message 
Protocol 
STUN: Simple traversal of UDP through 
NATs 
   FF; Fast flux 
P2P: Peer to peer 
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol 
UDP: User Datagram Protocol 
NetBIOS: Network basic 
input/output System 
 
 Another distinctive feature of CTU-13 dataset is that, each scenario has been 
manually analyzed and labeled. The labeling process was performed inside the NetFlow 
files. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the amount of data on each botnet scenario and 

















1 6.15 2824637 52 Neris 1 39933(1.41%) 
2 4.21 1808123 60 Neris 1 18839(1.04%) 
3 66.85 4710639 121 Rbot 1 26759(0.56%) 
4 4.21 1121077 53 Rbot 1 1719(0.15%) 
5 11.63 129833 37.6 Virut 1 695(0.53%) 
6 2.18 558920 30 Menti 1 4431(0.79%) 
7 0.38 114078 5.8 Sogou 1 37(0.03%) 
8 19.5 2954231 123 Murlo 1 5052(0.17%) 
9 5.18 2753885 94 Neris 10 179880(6.5%) 
10 4.75 1309792 73 Rbot 10 106315(8.11%) 
11 0.26 107252 5.2 Rbot 3 8161(7.6%) 
12 1.21 325472 8.3 NSIS.ay 3 2143(0.65%) 
13 16.36 1925150 34 Virut 1 38791(2.01%) 
 
2.2 ISCX Botnet Dataset 
ISCX botnet dataset was developed by Information Security Center of Excellence 
(ISCX) at the University of New Brunswick (UNB). Researchers at UNB have developed 
this dataset with the purpose to determine the performance of any intrusion detection 
approaches or making comparisons which requires experimentation with data that 
includes real time traffic [92]. ISCX botnet dataset is an evaluation dataset combining 
non overlapping subsets of three different available datasets:  ISOT dataset [21], ISCX 
2012 IDS dataset [93], and CTU-13 dataset [37]. In order to produce this synthetic 
dataset, the researchers have employed an overlay methodology [94] to combine all the 
three different datasets into one unified dataset which has wide range of bots. Final ISCX 
botnet dataset was divided into two training and test datasets, where we have selected as a 
test dataset to implement our methodology. Table 2.3 and 2.4 provide a clear insight to 
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different Botnet types and portion of flows in the ISCX botnet testing dataset. Access to 
this dataset is available upon request from the researchers of ISCX UNB. 
Table 2.3 Distribution of botnet types in the ISCX botnet test dataset 
Botnet name Type Flow portions in dataset 
Neris IRC 25967(5.67%) 
Rbot IRC 83(0.018%) 
Menti IRC 2878(0.62%) 
Sogou HTTP 89(0.019%) 
Murlo IRC 4881(1.06%) 
Virut HTTP 58576(12.80%) 
NSIS P2P 757(0.165%) 
Zeus P2P 502(0.109%) 
SMTP Spam P2P 21633(4.2%) 
UDP Storm P2P 44062(9.63%) 
Tbot IRC 1296(0.283%) 
Zero Access P2P 1011(0.221%) 
Weasel P2P 42313(9.25%) 
Smoke Bot P2P 78(0.017%) 
Zeus Control (C&C) P2P 31(0.006%) 








Table 2.4 List of all malicious in the ISCX botnet test dataset 
192.168.2.112 131.202.243.84 192.168.5.122 
198.164.30.2 192.168.2.110 192.168.4.118 
192.168.2.113 192.168.1.103 192.168.4.120 
192.168.2.112 192.168.2.109 192.168.2.105 
147.32.84.180 147.32.84.170 147.32.84.150 
147.32.84.140 147.32.84.130 147.32.84.160 
10.0.2.15 192.168.106.141 192.168.106.131 
172.16.253.130 172.16.253.131 172.16.253.129 
172.16.253.240 74.78.117.238 158.65.110.24 
192.168.3.35 192.168.3.25 192.168.3.65 
172.29.0.116 172.29.0.109 172.16.253.132 
192.168.248.165 10.37.130.4  
 
 The proposed approach in this study is first of its kind to convert the NetFlow 
features available from CTU-13 and ISCX dataset into graph-based features and use these 
graph features to detect botnets. As CTU-13 dataset is the most complete real world 
dataset [41], we choose this dataset primarily to prove the concept of our novel approach 
and as an extension we also use ISCX Botnet test dataset to compare the efficiency of 





This section discusses in detail the seven features used to detect botnets and the 
clustering methodology implemented to cluster these features. First of all, a directed 
graph is generated for each of 13 datasets of CTU-13. A directed graph (digraph) can be 
defined as a set of nodes connected by directed edges where each edge points from first 
node of a graph pair to the second node of the pair.  Mathematically, a directed graph can 
be expressed as an ordered pair   where V is a set of nodes and E is an ordered pair of 
edges. Note that, in this study each node denotes a unique IP address and each edge 
denotes the connection between one IP address to another. Subsequently, the feature 
values are calculated of these directed graphs and afterwards clustering methodology is 
applied to find out the nodes with similar features. 
3.1 Graph-Based Features Selection 
We have initially tried different combinations of 11 extracted graph features to 
check the percentage of nodes to be eliminated when SOM technique is implemented on 
13 CTU datasets (see Table 3.1). Among them, finally 7 features are selected. These 7 
features include the indegree, outdegree, sum of ingoing edges weight, sum of outgoing 
edges weight, clustering coefficient, node betweenness centrality, and eigen vector 
centrality. A set of 9 features include indegree duration and outdegree duration along 
with the 7 features. Finally, 11 features include ingoing protocol mode and outgoing 
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protocol mode in addition to the 9 features. Results from the Table 3.1 clearly indicate 
that percentage of nodes to be eliminated (number of nodes in the largest cluster) in 
further investigation of remaining nodes for bot detection in each dataset is very high 
(almost greater than 98%) when 7 features are used. 





% of nodes to be eliminated for bot detection 
7 Features 9 Features 11 Features 
1 311420 99.4608 59.8099 7.721405176 
2 442471 99.5556 67.1314 8.295006904 
3 434988 99.7388 91.6264 17.78968615 
4 186245 99.3540 75.8372 8.27887997 
5 41658 98.1180 83.7774 9.902059628 
6 107343 98.4433 67.7836 11.46604809 
7 38205 97.5265 80.356 10.04580552 
8 383788 99.7086 78.2263 13.34252243 
9 367264 99.7296 76.4496 11.14702231 
10 197824 99.5814 13.3265 11.59515529 
11 41933 96.8282 87.7877 9.155080724 
12 94436 98.5895 77.9152 9.551442247 
13 315769 99.2263 76.7827 9.36939978 
 
These observations clearly prove that the computational costs and the time that is 
required to search for the malicious activity will be much lower if the right combination 
of features are selected. The percentage of nodes for further investigation in identification 
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of bots is very high for 9 and 11 feature combinations compared to 7 feature 
combinations. Hence, it can be stated that it is vital to be efficient while extracting graph-
based features and implementing bot detection methodology on large datasets. Improper 
selection of features may result in increased computational cost. This is the main 
rationale behind to proceed with the 7 features combination to implement further 
investigations of our study. A brief discussion of these seven features is provided below: 
3.1.2 In Degree: 
If many suspected bots contact a malicious domain for C&C reasons, this will 
result in a relatively high in degree for this domain. Keeping this in mind, in degree has 
been chosen as a feature to detect botnet in a network. For a particular node in a directed 
graph, in degree can be defined as the total number of head ends adjacent to that node. 
High value of in degree for a node indicates the neighboring nodes tendency to establish 
more connection where as low value indicates the opposite. For example: Fig. 3.1 shows 
that node ‘a’ has an indegree of two. 
3.1.3 Out Degree: 
For a particular node in a directed graph, the total number of tail ends adjacent to 
a node is called the out degree of the node. A high value of out degree for a node implies 
that this node tends to make more connections with other nodes and low value implies the 
opposite. Bots tend to make more connection with other potential victim computers to 
spread the reach of botnet or to C&C domain for transferring information. So, out degree 
can be a useful indicator of botnet activity in a graph. As evident from Fig. 3.1, we can 
see that, node ‘a’ has an outdegree of two. 
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3.1.4 In Degree Weight: 
In degree weight refers to the total number of data packets received by a particular 
node transferred from its neighboring connected nodes. The mechanics of transferring 
data packets consists of setting up the data connection to the appropriate ports and 
choosing the parameters for transfer. Besides the raw data every data packet contains, it 
also has headers that carry certain types of metadata, along with the routing information 
and trailers that help in refining data transmission [77]. Botnets tend to communicate with 
each other or to the C&C server to transfer information or update their commands. The 
same type of botnets usually communicate periodically and with a predefined set of 
commands. We assume that bots will receive the same type of command and receive 
approximately same volume of information that can be used to differentiate between bots 
and non-bots. 
3.1.5 Out Degree Weight: 
Out degree weight is the opposite of in degree weight which can be described as 
the total number of data packets sent by a particular node to its neighboring connected 
nodes. Same as in degree weight, we assume that bots will have similarity in the volume 
of data it sends out to other IP addresses in the network and can be a useful indicator of 




Figure 3.1 A directed graph with three nodes 
 
3.1.6 Node Betweenness Centrality: 
In graph theory, node betweenness centrality quantifies the number of times a node 
acts as a bridge along the shortest path between two other nodes. More specifically, node 
betweenness centrality indicates a particular node's centrality in graph, which refers to how 
many shortest paths from all nodes to all others pass through that particular node [78]. 
Node betweenness centrality can be mathematically expressed as [79]: 
 𝑁𝐵(𝑣) = ∑
𝜎𝑢𝑤(𝑣)
𝜎𝑢𝑤
𝑢≠𝑣≠𝑤  (3.1) 
Where 𝜎𝑢𝑤 is the total number of shortest paths from node ‘u’ to ‘w’ and 𝜎𝑒𝑏(𝑣) is 
total number of shortest paths that pass-through node ‘v’. Figure 3.2 illustrates the concept 




Figure 3.2 Node betweenness centrality 
 
When calculating betweenness centrality for node a, total number of paths can be 
formed between these nodes i.e., (e,d), (e,b), (e,c). 









= 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 (3.2) 
Node betweenness centrality can be a useful feature to detect botnets especially in 
detecting P2P botnets where bots are more interconnected without a central C2C structure. 
So, we assume that for a P2P bot in a botnet should have a higher node betweenness 
centrality in a graph. 
3.1.7 Local Clustering Coefficient 
Local clustering coefficient of a node indicates how concentrated the 
neighborhood of that node is. More specifically, local clustering coefficient is a metric to 
evaluate how close a node’s neighbors are to each other. If K_a denotes the number of 
neighbors of node ‘a’ and  e_a denotes the number of connected pairs between all 







Figure 3.3 shows the clustering coefficient of node ‘a’ which is 0.083. Local 
clustering coefficient can also be a very significant indicator of a P2P botnet. As 
explained before, bots in P2P botnet have a decentralized structure where bots connect 
and communicate with each other to remove the need of a centralized server. As a result, 
interconnectedness can be a very significant feature to detect P2P botnets which is 
essentially the basis of local clustering coefficient. 
 
Figure 3.3 Clustering coefficient of node ‘a’ in a directed graph 
Clustering coefficient of node ‘a’ in directed graph, 𝑪𝒂 =
𝟏
(𝟒∗𝟑)
= 𝟎. 𝟎𝟖𝟑 
Local clustering coefficient can also be a very significant indicator of a P2P 
botnet. As explained before, bots in P2P botnet have a decentralized structure where bots 
connect and communicate with each other to remove the need of a centralized server. As 
a result, interconnectedness can be a very significant feature to detect P2P botnets which 
is essentially the basis of local clustering coefficient. 
3.1.8 Eigen Vector Centrality 
Eigen vector centrality, also known as Eigen centrality is a measurement criterion 
of influence of a node in a graph. It is essentially the weight of a node in a graph [82]. 
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Each node is assigned a relative value based on the concept that connections to high-
scoring nodes contribute more to the score of the node than equal connections to low-
scoring nodes. Let G(V,E) be a graph where V is total number of nodes and E is the total 
number of edges. Let, A= (a_(v,w))  be the adjacency matrix where 
 𝑎𝑣,𝑤 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑣 𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑤
         0  𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑣 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑤
 (3.4) 




∑ 𝑎𝑣,𝑤𝑥𝑤𝑤∈𝑀(𝑣)  (3.5) 
where 𝑀(𝑣) is the set of neighbors of node ‘v’ and  𝜆 is a constant. Now equation (1) can 
be rewritten as  
 𝐴𝑥 =  𝜆𝑥 (3.6) 
There exists a positive solution λ with final eigenvector after using power method 
based on the Perron–Frobenius theorem [83]. λ is also the largest eigenvalue associated 
with the eigenvector of the adjacency matrix [84]. Eigenvector centrality is a natural 
extension of degree centrality. In-degree centrality awards one centrality points for every 
link a node receives. But not all nodes are equivalent: some are more important than 
others based on their edge weight, and, reasonably, connections from important nodes 
count more. We expect that a bots eigenvector centrality measure should be significantly 






3.2 Self Organizing Map 
Self Organizing Map (SOM) belongs to an interesting class of unsupervised 
system that is based on competitive learning in which the output neurons compete 
amongst themselves to be activated. The primary goal of an SOM is to convert an 
incoming dataset of arbitrary dimension into a one or two-dimensional discrete map, and 
to perform this transformation adaptively in a topologically ordered fashion [85]. In this 
study, we have considered on a particular kind of SOM known as Kohonen network that 
was developed by Tuevo Kohonen in 1982 [95-96].  
 The basic structure of SOM is shown in Figure 3.4 is a 3×3 SOM network. For 
this small SOM network, there are 63 connections. Notice that the map nodes(𝐶1 − 𝐶9) 
are not connected to one another. In this 2-D representation of SOM, each map node has 
a unique (i,j) coordinate. Simultaneously, as map nodes are only connected to input 
vector (𝐹1 − 𝐹7), map nodes are never aware of what other map nodes values are. A map 
node’s weight (W) will only be updated if and only if the input vector tells it. Algorithm 
1 illustrates the basic methodology behind SOM. 
 
Figure 3.4 Structure of Self Organizing Map 
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Table 3.2  Algorithm 1: SOM Algorithm 
1. Each map nodes(𝑪𝟏 − 𝑪𝟗) weights (W) are initialized with small random 
values. 
2. An input vector (𝑭𝟏 − 𝑭𝟕) is chosen from the training dataset and is 
presented to the network. 
3. Each node is inspected to determine which node’s weight best matches the 
input vector’s weight. The winning node is termed as ‘Winning Neuron’ or 
‘Winner Takes All Neuron’ or ‘Best Matching Unit (BMU)’. BMU can be 
calculated as 
 𝑩𝑴𝑼 = 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒊𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕 𝒗𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓 = ∑ (𝑭𝒊 − 𝑾𝒊)
𝟐𝑫
𝒊=𝟏  (3.7) 
4. The radius of the BMU is calculated which is typically set to be the radius of 
the network that diminishes at each time-step. This can be calculated as 
 𝝈(𝒕) = 𝝈𝟎𝒆
−𝒕
𝝀  (3.8) 
            where t is the current iteration, 𝝀 is the time constant and  is the 
            radius of the map.  can be calculated as 
 𝛌 = 𝐧𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐦𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐮𝐬⁄  (3.9) 
             Any node found within the radius of BMU is adjusted to make more 
             like the input vector.  This adjustment can be done by 
 𝑾(𝒕 + 𝟏) = 𝑾(𝒕) + 𝚽(𝒕)𝑳(𝒕)(𝑿(𝒕) − 𝑾(𝒕)) (3.10) 
Where, 
 𝑳(𝒕) = 𝑳𝟎𝒆
−𝒕
𝝀  (3.11) 
 𝚽(𝒕) = 𝒆
−𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑭𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑩𝑴𝑼𝟐
𝟐𝝈𝟐(𝒕)  (3.12) 
 
W(t+1) is the new educated weight value of a given node and  is a measure that 
is used to force the nodes closer to BMU to learn more than others who are further away. 
5. Repeat 2 for desired number of iterations 
 
In this study, an investigated has been conducted for the accuracy of the detection 
algorithm with three different SOM models, i.e., 4*4, 5*5, and 6*6. Among these three 
SOM models, 5*5 provides the best solution. With 4*4 SOM model, bots were being 
identified in a comparatively larger cluster than 5*5 SOM model whereas with 6*6 SOM 
model, many clusters were empty. Hence, 5*5 SOM model was used for the 
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demonstration of the effectiveness of this proposed detection method. However, the 
difference among the results was not significant and using any of them will result in good 
accuracy.  Each map nodes weights in the network are initially assigned with seven 
random values. After that input vectors, each containing these seven features are 
presented to the network.  Thenceforth, step 3 to 6 is followed to get the desired number 
of clusters. 
In its essence, algorithm 1 is essentially screening the dataset and assigning the 
nodes to different clusters. This algorithm does not distinguish bots from non-bots. Hence 
another algorithm is developed to detect bots in the clusters. This bot detection algorithm 
is illustrated below: 
Table 3.3 Algorithm 2: Bot search algorithm 
1. Arrange the clusters in ascending order of size. 
2. Remove the cluster with the highest number of nodes.  
3. Starting with the smallest cluster, investigate all the nodes in the rest of 
the clusters. 
4. Stop the algorithm when bots are detected. The number of nodes needed 
to identify the bots is denoted by 𝑁𝑠, which characterizes the efficiency 
of the proposed bot detection algorithm. 
 
It is consequential that algorithm 2 is performed with caution as the efficiency of 
SOM method can be significantly hampered if bots are not identified properly in this 
step. After initiating step 1, step 2 is performed based on considering our finding that 
botnet flows are typically a small proportion of the overall dataset. As the percentage of 
botnet flow is very small, we delete the cluster that have the highest number of nodes by 
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assuming bots are not large in number and don't possess the usual similarities to share the 
same cluster with normal nodes. The criteria for differentiating bots from non-bots must 
be clearly defined and implemented for the success of this method. Eventually, this is 
also true that we cannot guarantee the largest cluster will not contain a bot if the bot acts 




CASE STUDY-DETECTING BOTS IN CTU-13 
We apply SOM to the CTU-13 dataset to investigate the effectiveness and 
efficiency of our proposed method. An enhanced filtering algorithm, based on the degree 
of bots, is proposed to further improve the botnet detection efficiency. The results are 
benchmarked against a Support Vector Machine based classification algorithm to 
demonstrate the strength of our proposed procedure. 
4.1 Graph Features Extraction 
We first extract graph-based features of CTU-13 data sets as discussed in Chapter 
3. Recall that the CTU-13 data sets contain more than 20 million NetFlow records. High 
performance computing is needed to streamline to the extraction of graph-based features. 
The computation tasks of feature extraction are performed using the Shadow system, 
super computer available at The High Performance Computing Collaboratory (HPC²) of 
Mississippi State University. The Shadow system is equipped with a Cray CS300-LC 
cluster with 4800 Intel Ivy Bridge processor cores and 28,800 Intel Xeon Phi cores. With 
the aid of high performance computing capacity, we are able to extract the graph-based 
features from all CTU-13 data sets within 20 hours. The resultant graph-based features 
are numbered and labeled by Feature 1 – Feature 7 for the notational convenience, as 
shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Graph-Based Features Used for Clustering. 




















4.1.2 Graph-Based Botnet Detection Using Clustering 
We apply the SOM-based botnet detection algorithm (Algorithm 1) to the 
extracted seven graph-based features. Fig. 4.1 demonstrates the results of SOM clustering 
based on CTU dataset 6. There is a total number of 25 cells, each representing a possible 
cluster of graph-based features. We choose the total number of cells to be 25 so that the 
SOM algorithm can captures various types of node behaviors while not significantly 
increasing computation costs. 
 




Table 4.2 Number of nodes in the biggest cluster (Normal Nodes). 
Dataset No. of Nodes No. of Nodes in the biggest 
cluster 
% of nodes to be 
eliminated for bot 
detection 
1 311420 309741 99.4608 
2 442471 440505 99.5556 
3 434988 433852 99.7388 
4 186245 185042 99.3540 
5 41658 40874 98.1180 
6 107343 105672 98.4433 
7 38205 37260 97.5265 
8 383788 382670 99.7086 
9 367264 366271 99.7296 
10 197824 196996 99.5814 
11 41933 40603 96.8282 
12 94436 93104 98.5895 
13 315769 313326 99.2263 
 
From Figure 4.1, the numbers in each cell represent the total number of nodes that 
belong to the corresponding cluster. These nodes share similar behaviors in terms of the 
identified graph-based features. For example, there exist 105,672 nodes in the biggest 
cluster (in blue), which accounts for over 99% of nodes in Dataset 6. Note that malicious 
behaviors i.e., the botnet flows are typically a small proportion of the entire dataset and 
when compared to normal flows, botnet flows possess high range of feature values 
because they are very active in the network. So, we delete the clusters that have the 
highest number of nodes that don't possess the usual characteristics that a bot might have. 
This helps to narrow down the identification of bots to the remaining few nodes, which 
account for less than 1% of the total nodes. Similar observations are made for the other 
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CTU datasets that the majority of the nodes belongs to the biggest cluster and can be 
eliminated from the consideration of bot detection (see Table 4.2). For most of the CTU 
scenarios, the biggest cluster consists of over 99% of nodes. This allows us to eliminate 
the majority of the dataset for further bot identification, significantly reducing the cost of 
computation. 
We apply the proposed bot search algorithm (Algorithm 2) to the clusters 
obtained via SOM. Table 4.3 shows the number of nodes to search to identify all bots in 
each data set. The sizes of clusters that include the bots are also reported. Bots can be 
isolated in small clusters for most data sets. As a result, bots can be identified by 






















Size of the 
bot cluster 
𝑁𝑠 % of nodes to search 
1 1 1 27 120 0.038 
2 1 1 12 41 0.009 
3 1 1 26 125 0.028 
4 1 1 40 238 0.127 
5 1 1 6 26 0.062 
6 1 1 38 163 0.151 
7 1 1 11 44 0.115 
8 1 1 184 563 0.146 
9 10 3 21 73 0.019 
7 40 63 0.017 
10 10 10 20 90 0.045 
11 3 2 9 24 0.057 





2 11 53 0.056 
1 19 60 0.063 
13 1 1 16 64 0.020 
 
It shows that the proposed method can detect botnet size in a cluster which is very 
small compared to the size of the total dataset. Hence, after applying SOM on the dataset, 
further investigating the nodes of the small clusters gives the bots present in the dataset. 
Bots have been mostly found in small sized clusters. More specifically, in more than 80% 
of the cases, bots have been found within the smaller clusters containing only 20% of the 
remaining nodes. Although, it still may take some computational effort to further 
investigate clusters after initial screening, it is considerably less than the computational 




From Table 4.4, it is apparent that although SOM methodology provides good 
results in alienating bots from the rest of the nodes, there are no unique values of features 
across all bot clusters. From Figure 4.2 it is clear that feature values are far apart for 
different nodes. The highest and lowest values of features have been made bold to better 
clarify the finding. For example: feature 1 values range from 1 to 6842 and feature 2 
values range from 3 to 11571 across all bot clusters. So, there is no fixed range for the 
feature values of bots across all the scenarios. A notable conclusion that can be made 
from this experiment is that rule based detection methods will not work well in detecting 
botnets as different bots behave differently in different scenarios. Thus, detecting botnets 
become very challenging. This limitation can be by passed by the proposed approach as it 
does not rely on any particular rule. With different types of bot behaviors, the proposed 
method can still detect bot with reasonable accuracy. What this approach ensures is that, 
bots will always be found in small sized clusters. A majority of the data (>97%) is 
removed from consideration, and thus the sample space becomes very negligible. This 
relatively smaller sample space need be further investigated to detect botnets. Hence, this 
proves the robustness of our proposed approach as it can detect botnets with varying 















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 27 176 2703 2595 48690 0.0113 0.0007 0.00022 
2 12 110 4161 3140 134500 0.0109 0.0003 0.00017 
3 26 1727 2391 176967 8806 0.0171 0.0019 0.00122 
4 40 153 859 1970 43356 0.0847 0.0003 0.00056 
5 6 7 483 310 28527 0 0.0004 1.14E-05 
6 38 26 428 1443 12128 0.0449 0.0003 4.72E-05 
7 11 25 385 231 21990 0.0283 0.0005 0.00033 
8 184 34 289 470 17650 0.1344 3.08E-5 3.84E-06 
9 
40 150 6534 3214 121087 0.0512 0.0007 0.000990 
21 86 5240 2662 219182 0.0006 0.0006 0.00055 
10 20 6842 7462 6581 355098 0.0145 0.0023 0.16417 
11 
9 1219 2883 1223 27505 0 0.0006 0.19237 
770 1 3 3 100 0.0110 6.22E-5 5.51E-06 
12 
 
11 509 328 57287 6897 0 0.0019 0.00017 
19 169 85 31608 2771 0.0217 0.0005 0.000283 







Figure 4.2 Variation of average feature values in Bot clusters 
 
4.2 Feature Evaluations and SOM Based Botnet Detection on Filtered Dataset 
In this section, SOM has been applied to filtered CTU-13 dataset to determine 
whether filtering the raw data provides better result than shown in section 4.1. What 
filtering is essentially doing is that it is removing nodes that cannot be a bot. The basic 
assumption made here is that 1-degree nodes can’t be a bot as they are not very active in 
the network. As a result, total number of nodes where SOM needs to be applied get 
significantly reduced. The steps of filtering are provided below: 
1. First convert the flow-based data into graph-based data. 
2. Each IP is considered as a node and each connection is considered as an 
edge. 
3. If there are multiple communications between two nodes, we still 
represent them with a single edge, and add other data as weight (attributes) 
of that edge. 
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4. Calculate the feature values of each node. 
5. Compute the degree of each node, and then filter out (remove) the 1-
degree nodes and their corresponding edges from the graph 
Subsequently, SOM has been applied to this filtered dataset. Note that, we have 
only used ten filtered datasets for experimental purpose. Results obtained from applying 
SOM on filtered dataset is shown in Table 4.5. 










Size of the bot 
cluster 
𝑵𝒔 % of 
nodes to 
search 
1 117119 1 1 27 115 0.098 
3 20284 1 1 18 96 0.473 
4 81544 1 1 33 181 0.002 
5 1939 1 1 7 65 3.352 
6 8240 1 1 45 252 3.058 
7 2486 1 1 8 40 1.609 
8 20666 1 1 61 307 1.485 
10 91785 10 10 17 77 0.083 
11 2498 3 2 8 21 0.840 
1 146 384 15.372 
12 4743 3 3 5 36 0.759 
 
Results in Table 4.5 show that, after filtering, total number of nodes to examine to 
apply SOM gets reduced. Moreover, after applying SOM, in majority of the cases the size 
of the cluster where bot is found is smaller than before. Figure 4.3 illustrates this 
phenomenon. It is clearly evident from the figure that, for the 10th scenario the bot 
cluster size is smaller after filtering. Here, the red star is the bot and black dots are the 




Figure 4.3 Bot cluster size before and after filtering 
 
As a result, the numbers of nodes to search for bot identification (𝑁𝑠) are shown 
in Table 4.6 Significant reduction in 𝑁𝑠 can be observed. For example, 1306 nodes need 
to be searched for identifying the third bot in Dataset 11. After filtering, 384 nodes need 
to be searched only, a reduction of over 70% of the total number of nodes. For dataset 12, 
the two clusters containing bots are combined into one after filtering, requiring searching 
36 nodes only compared to 113 nodes before clustering. However, we also observed the 











Table 4.6 Improvement of 𝑁𝑠 using Filtering 
Dataset Botnet detection without 
filtering 
Botnet detection after filtering 
𝑁𝑠 % nodes to 
search 
𝑁𝑠 % nodes to 
search 
1 120 0.038 115 0.036 
3 125 0.028 96 0.022 
4 238 0.127 181 0.097 
5 26 0.062 65 0.156 
6 163 0.151 252 0.234 
7 44 0.115 40 0.104 
8 563 0.146 307 0.079 
10 90 0.045 77 0.038 
11 24 0.057 21 0.050 
1306 3.114 384 0.915 
12 53 0.056 36 0.038 
60 0.063 
 
4.3 Extension of SOM Implementation on ISCX botnet test dataset 
In order to check the efficiency of the proposed methodology to compare with 
CTU-13, we have extracted the same 7 graph-based features for the new ISCX botnet test 
dataset. We have implemented the proposed SOM Algorithm 1, same as before. From 
Figure 4.4 the numbers in each cell represent the total number of nodes that belong to the 
corresponding cluster. These nodes share similar behaviors in terms of the identified 
graph-based features. For example, there exist 26,652 nodes in the biggest cluster (in 




Figure 4.4 SOM on ISCX botnet test dataset 
 
From Table 4.7 number of bots identified in each cluster shows the malicious 
nodes of ISCX dataset have been scattered into the smallest clusters. As we discussed 
before abnormal/malicious behaviors are rare in most of real-world networks and the 
biggest cluster (with maximum number of nodes) are unlikely to be bots. In further 
inspection, the nodes in the biggest cluster can be eliminated to reduce the computational 
costs in further investigation of bots. From Table 4.8 the percentage of nodes to be 
eliminated is more than 93%. Comparing with the results of CTU-13 dataset, it is true 
that similar observations are drawn when the proposed methodology has been 
implemented on ISCX Botnet test dataset. It again proves the robustness of the proposed 
methodology and also we expect the method of detecting bot in the rest of the small 
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clusters by eliminating the biggest cluster will hold true for any other new datasets but we 
cannot guarantee it. 
Table 4.7 Number of nodes in each cluster of ISCX Botnet test dataset after 
implementing proposed methodology 
Cluster number Number of nodes in 
each cluster 
Number of bots 
identified in each 
cluster 
1 1 0 
2 3 0 
3 4 2 
4 4 0 
5 5 2 
6 5 1 
7 8 0 
8 9 0 
9 12 0 
10 14 2 
11 15 1 
12 19 2 
13 27 1 
14 35 1 
15 42 5 
16 43 1 
17 50 0 
18 61 3 
19 96 4 
20 112 3 
21 167 1 
22 266 2 
23 312 0 
24 594 3 






Table 4.8 Create a short, concise table title and place all detailed caption, notes, 




Total number of 
nodes 
Number of nodes in 
the biggest cluster 




35 28556 26652 93.3324 
 
4.4 Benchmark Against Classification Techniques 
We compare our proposed clustering approach with some of the available 
classification techniques to detect bots. 
4.4.1 Support Vector Machine Classifier 
Support vector machine (SVM) is a powerful supervised machine learning 
technique [54], which is used for classification and regression analysis. It is introduced by 
Cortes and Vapnik [53]. Basically, SVM classifies the data into two classes by generating 
an optimal hyper-plane, which has the largest distance to the nearest training samples. To 
predict the class of new observations, the SVM learning algorithm, splits data to training 
and validation set. The decision boundary (i.e., a hyper-plane) is determined using training 
set. Subsequently, SVM classifier predicts class of the observations for validation set based 
on the distance of each observation from decision boundary. Optimal hyperplane dividing 
the data in to two classes can be written as set of point ?⃗? satisfying 𝑤 ⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗. ?⃗? + b = 0  , where  
?⃗⃗⃗? is the normal vector of the hyperplane [55]. The parameter b gives the offset distance 
from the origin. The parallel marginal hyperplanes can be given by the equations, 
?⃗⃗⃗?. ?⃗? + b = 1         (4.1) 
?⃗⃗⃗?. ?⃗? + b = -1         (4.2) 
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Two parallel marginal hyperplanes are generated on both the sides of the optimal 
hyperplane that separates the data. The sample points which are used to generate the 
optimal hyper-plane are called the support vectors (SVs). The distance between the two 





Figure 4.5 Shows the linear separating hyperplane for the separable case, and the solid 
circle and squares on the margin are called support vectors. 
 
If the dataset is not linearly separable, one can use more general kernel functions 
that provides non-linear decision boundaries by generating a hyperplane in a multi-
dimensional feature space. The kernel function(ϕ) plays a critical role in the SVM 
training and classification. Some commonly implemented kernel functions [9056] are the 
Gaussian radial basis function (RBF) kernel, Polynomial kernel and the Sigmoid kernel. 




4.4.2 K-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) Classifier 
K-NN is one of the widely-used machine learning algorithms, which is an 
extension of the nearest neighbor (NN) classifier [9157]. K-NN classifies an object by 
choosing the majority vote of its nearest neighbors. Here, the object will be designated to 
a class based on the most frequent class of its K nearest neighbors, where K is a user 
defined constant. In a multidimensional feature space, all the training sample are vectors 
assigned with a class label. During the training phase, the classifier remembers the class 
labels and feature values of the training samples. For instance, assume that x_0 is a test 
point (an unlabeled vector) which is needed to be classified in a testing phase. When a K-
nearest neighbor query starts, it grows like a spherical region until the query is enclosed 
by K training samples. When the classifier finds the set of desired K nearest neighbors in 
the training set to x_0, it classifies the test point as the most frequent class among the K 
neighbors closer to it.  
Considering the outcome of K-NN on 1 nearest neighbor as shown in the example 
Figure 4.6 the prediction of K-NN of the test sample (orange circle) will be ‘+’ as it is 
closer to it. If K = 2, K-NN will be not able to classify the test sample outcome since the 
second closest sample is ‘-‘, both the minus and plus signs receive the same score. If K is 
3 then the outcome is ‘-‘, and if K is 5 then it is ‘+’ as the respective signs dominate the 
nearest neighbors in each case. In our case the k value is 5 and Euclidian distance method 







Figure 4.6 K-NN classification approach 
 
4.4.3 Decision Tree classifier (DT) 
Decision Tree is a well-known supervised machine learning technique that is used 
for classification and regression analysis. The basic idea of DT is to predict the class of a 
variable based on the training model by learning decision rules. The algorithm of DT is 
very simple and it can be represented by a tree structure. Initially while training, the 
algorithm tries to split the root node into subsets based on the decision value and it goes 
till the leaf node is found. Hence, whenever there is a new set of data point to predict, DT 
simply compares the new data point with the trained model and determines which class it 
belongs to. For instance, form the Figure 4.7, if there is a new data Z and needs to be 
defined weather Bot or None-Bot, then first the algorithm tries to use the attributes value 
of the test data and compare with the training set. Assume if the value of the attribute x_2 
is < -0.55 then it picks the left branch and goes to next subset and again if the value of 




Figure 4.7 Example of Decision Tree Classification 
 
4.5 Classification Results 
The programs of all the three classifiers is available in MATLAB packages. We 
train the SVM, K-NN and DT classifiers using ISCX botnet test dataset and use CTU-13 
datasets for testing the classifiers. Training the classifiers in one of the important step 
while implementing classification techniques. As ISCX dataset is a combination of three 
different subset datasets which includes CTU data we choose this as a training dataset. 
During the training phase the classifier learn and frame guidelines in differentiating bot 
and non-bot based on the feature values provided.  
The classification techniques cannot provide efficient result in accurately 
classifying the CTU-13 datasets to Bot and Non-Bot classes, since there is high variation 
in feature values. Specifically, due to the complex behaviors of bots, classification 
becomes challenging as characteristics of training and testing data can significantly vary. 
The percentage of misclassification by using three classifiers are presented in Table 4.9. 
The three classifiers are only capable of determining just 10% of accurate classification 
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for the 10th and 11th datasets only. However, for the rest of the scenarios, 
misclassification rates are 100%. 
Table 4.9 Classification result. 
Implemented on 
CTU 13 Dataset 
% of Misclassification and comparison between classifiers 
trained with ISCX Botnet dataset 
SVM DT KNN 
1 100 100 100 
2 100 100 100 
3 100 100 100 
4 100 100 100 
5 100 100 100 
6 100 100 100 
7 100 100 100 
8 100 100 100 
9 100 100 100 
10 90 90 90 
11 90 90 90 
12 100 100 100 






In this work, we propose a graph-based botnet detection approach that can detect 
changing behaviors of bots. This is novel because the existing approaches mainly rely on 
flow-based features and thus do not capture the changes in the topological structure of 
networks caused by bot activities. We investigate seven graphed-based features that are 
may be connected to bot activities: in degree, out degree, in degree weight, out degree 
weight, clustering coefficient, node betweenness, and eigenvector centrality. SOM is 
applied to establish the clusters of nodes based on these graphed features. Our approach 
is capable of isolating bots in clusters with very small sizes (less than 100 nodes), which 
enables fast detection of bot nodes. The proposed algorithm is further enhanced by 
filtering out inactive nodes, which are unlikely to be bots. We verify the proposed 
methods using CTU-13 and ISCX Botnet dataset. Numerical results show that our 
proposed procedure is capable of detecting the bots by searching limited number of 
nodes. 
We compare our approach with three different classification algorithms using the 
same graph-based features. All the methods are not capable of detecting most of the bots 
because of the varying values of bot features across different datasets (Bot features vary 
from one dataset to another). The advantage of our approach is that we focusing on 
capturing the abnormal behaviors of bots in terms of their graph-based behaviors. In other 
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words, our method is more robust against the changing behaviors of bots because the 
proposed approach does not rely on any particular value/range of features. With different 
types of bot behavior, the proposed method can still detect bot with reasonable accuracy. 
What this approach ensures is that, bots will always be found in small sized clusters with 
the majority of nodes (>99%) removed from further consideration. Our study shows that, 
as long as the bots behave differently from normal nodes, such different behaviors can be 
captured by our clustering-based detection algorithm and further testing is needed in 
determining the bots from the smallest clusters. Future work is needed to incorporate 
additional graph-based features and reduce the computational costs of graph feature 
extraction and testing on other datasets. Note that, as feature extraction cost contributes to 
the overall computational cost, future work is needed to investigate how feature 
extraction cost can be minimized. Effect of incorporating more relevant graph-based 
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